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Recent Developments
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW - FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT - EXEMP-
TION 5 INCLUDES A QUALIFIED PRIVILEGE FOR CONFIDENTIAL COM-
MERCIAL INFORMATION.
Federal Open Market Committee v. Merrill (U.S. 1979)
The Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC),1 which has exclusive
control over the open market operations 2 of the Federal Reserve System,3
issues monthly Domestic Policy Directives 4 which summarize the FOMC's
deliberations and provide guidelines for the growth of the nation's money
supply and for the federal funds rate. 5 In 1975, David Merrill, acting under
the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA),6 requested disclosure of, among
1. The FOMC consists of the seven members of the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System and five representatives of the Federal Reserve Banks. See 12 U.S.C. § 263(a)
(1976). For an explanation of the Federal Reserve System, see note 3 infra.
2. Federal Open Mkt. Comm. v. Merrill, 99 S. Ct. 2800, 2804 (1979). Open market opera-
tions involve the purchases and sales of government securities in the domestic securities mar-
ket. Id. Through open market operations, the FOMC influences the expansion or contraction of
the nation's money markets. Id. at 2803-05.
3. Id. at 2804. The Federal Reserve System consists of individual member banks, district
Federal Reserve Banks, the Federal Open Market Committee, and the Board of Governors. See
BOARD OF GOvERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD, THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM,
PURPOSES AND FUNCTIONS 13 (1974). The principal purpose of the Federal Reserve System is
to regulate the flow of credit and money in order to foster orderly economic growth. Id. at 1-2.
4. 99 S. Ct. at 2804. The Domestic Policy Directives indicate whether the monetary policy
for the future month will be expansionary, deflationary, or unchanged. Id. The Directives in-
clude both factual data and supporting material, and have recently contained specific tolerance
ranges for the growth in the nation's money supply and federal funds rate. Id. at 2804-05 & n.5.
The Domestic Policy Directives are immediately provided to the account manager of the Sys-
tem Open Market Account, a combined investment pool of all Federal Reserve Banks, in order
to guide him in the actual implementation of the FOMC's policy through open market opera-
tion. Id. at 2804, 2805.
The Directives are subsequently incorporated in a document called the Record of Policy
Actions, which also includes other policy statements, and an explanation of the rationale for the
committee's actions and the votes of its members. Merrill v. Federal Open Mkt. Comm., 413
F. Supp. 494, 499-500 (D.D.C. 1976), aff'd, 565 F.2d 778 (D.C. Cir. 1977), vacated and re-
mianded, 99 S. Ct. 2800 (1979). The minutes of the FOMC's monthly meetings are embodied in
Memoranda of Discussion. 413 F. Supp. at 500.
5. 99 S. Ct. at 2804 & n.5. "The federal funds rate is the rate at which commercial banks
are willing to lend or borrow immediately available reserves on an overnight basis." Id. (citation
omitted).
6. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976), as amended by Act of Oct. 13, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-454, tit. IX,
§ 906(a)(10), 92 Stat. 1225. The relevant disclosure provisions of the FOIA provide in pertinent
part:
(a) Each agency shall make available to the public, information as follows:
(1) Each agency shall separately state and currently publish in the Federal Register
for the guidance of the public -
(D) substantive rules of general applicability adopted as authorized by law, and
statements of general policy or interpretations of general applicability formulated and
adopted by the agency; ....
(507)
1
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other things, the FOMC's current Domestic Policy Directives. 7  The
FOMC refused Merrill's request, 8 citing the FOMC's disclosure regulations
which permit public release of the Domestic Policy Directives only after
they expire. 9
5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (1976). For a discussion of the history and purposes of the FOIA, see notes
17-23 and accompanying text infra.
7. 99 S. Ct. at 2806. Merrill was a student at Georgetown University Law Center and a
member of the school's Institute for Public Interest Representation. 1d. at 2805-06. Professing a
strong interest in administrative law and a desire to study the process by which the Federal
Open Market Committee regulates the national money supply, Merrill, in March, 1975, re-
quested the FOMC's Records of Policy Actions for its January and February meetings of 1975,
including the Domestic Policy Directives, and the Memoranda of Discussion pertaining to those
meetings. See 413 F. Sopp. at 498. For an explanation of the Domestic Policy Directives and
the Memoranda of Discussion, see note 4 supra.
8. 99 S. Ct. at 2806. The FOMC's denial of the request for current Domestic Policy Direc-
tives was implicit in its refusal of the plaintiff's request for disclosure of the Records of Policy
Actions, since the Domestic Policy Directives are included in those documents. 413 F. Supp. at
500. See note 4 supra. ]i the district court, the FOMC maintained that such documents were
exempt from disclosure under exemption 5 of the FOIA. 413 F. Supp. at 502. See note 11 and
accompanying text infra.
Plaintiff's request for the Memoranda of Discussion, which were customarily released to the
public approximately five years following the relevant meeting, was also denied by the FOMC.
413 F. Supp. at 499-500. Although the denial was not authorized by regulation, the FOMC
contended that these documents also fit within exemption 5 of the FOIA. Id. at 499. For a
discussion of this exemption, see notes 11 & 24-47 and accompanying text infra.
9. 99 S. Ct. at 2806. See 12 C.F.R. § 271.5 (1978). The regulation relied upon by the
FOMC provides:
(a) Deferred availability (f information. In some instances, certain types of informa-
tion of the Committee are not published in the FEDERAL REGISTER or made available
for public inspection or copying until after such period of time as the Committee may
determine to be reasonably necessary to avoid the effects described in paragraph (b) of
this section or as may otherwise be necessary to prevent impairment of the effective
discharge of the Committee's statutory responsibilities.
(b) Reasons for deferment of availability. Publication of, or access to, certain infor-
mation of the Committee may be deferred because earlier disclosure of such information
would:
(1) Interfere with the orderly execution of policies adopted by the Committee in
the performance of its statutory functions;
(2) Permit speculators and others to gain unfair profits or to obtain unfair advan-
tages by speculative trading in securities, foreign exchange, or otherwise;
(3) Result in unnecessary or unwarranted disturbances in the securities market;
(4) Make open market operations more costly;
(5) Interfere with the orderly execution of the objectives or policies of other
Government agencies concerned with domestic or foreign economic or fiscal matters;
or
(6) Interfere with, or impair the effectiveness of, financial transactions with
foreign banks, bankers, or countries that may influence the flow of gold and of dollar
balances to or from foreign countries.
id.
At the time of plaintiffs initial request, the Domestic Policy Directives first had to be
incorporated into the Record of Policy Actions at the FOMC's subsequent monthly meeting,
and then published in the Federal Register 90 days after that meeting. 413 F. Supp. at 499-500.
See 32 Fed. Reg. 9,518, 9,519 (1967). The 90-day period was later amended to 45 days. 40 Fed.
Reg. 13,204 (1975). This amendment became effective after Merrill's initial request for disclo-
sure and was operative during the FOMC's consideration of his request. 413 F. Supp. at 499. A
1976 amendment changed the delay period for the publication of Records of Policy Actions from
45 days to "a few days after the next regularly scheduled meeting." 41 Fed. Reg. 22,261 (1976).
2
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Merrill then filed suit in the United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of Columbia, requesting declaratory and injunctive relief against the
operation of the FOMC disclosure regulation. 10 Rejecting the FOMC's ar-
gument that the documents were exempt from disclosure by exemption 5 of
the FOIA, 11 the district court granted summary judgment for the plaintiff12
and ordered the publication of the current Domestic Policy Directives in the
Federal Register. 13 The United States Court of Appeals for the District of
The FOMC promulgated this amendment after the district court entered judgment for the
plaintiff. 565 F.2d at 782. See note 13 infra. However, even the amended regulation effectively
bars release of ctrrent Domestic Policy Directives, since they become inoperative after the next
monthly meeting. 99 S. Ct. at 2805.
When plaintiff requested a reconsideration of the FOMC's administrative determination,
Governor Robert C. Holland, a member of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
Board, released the Records of Policy Actions. 413 F. Supp. at 499. However, the 45-day delay
period from the day of adoption had already elapsed; thus, the Domestic Policy Directives
contained in the Records no longer represented the current and effective policy of the FOMC.
Id. Governor Holland also denied the plaintiffs request for the Memoranda of Discussion on
the ground that they were exempt under exemption 5 of the FOIA. Id. See note 8 supra. For a
discussion of the trial court's adjudication of plaintiff's request for the Records of Policy Actions
and Memoranda of Discussion, see note 13 infra.
10. 413 F. Supp. at 499. Plaintiff's suit was authorized by subsection (a)(4)(B) of the FOIA,
which provides:
(B) On complaint, the district court of the United States in the district in which the
complainant resides, or has his principal place of business, or in which the agency records
are situated, or in the District of Columbia, has jurisdiction to enjoin the agency from
withholding agency records and to order the production of any agency records improperly
withheld from the complainant. In such a case the court shall determine the matter de
novo, and may examine the contents of such agency records in camera to determine
whether such records or any part thereof shall be withheld under any of the exemptions
set forth in subsection (b) of this section, and the burden is on the agency to sustain its
action.
5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (1976).
11. 413 F. Supp, at 503. Exemption 5 of the FOIA exempts from the general disclosure
provision matters that are "inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would
not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency." 5 U.S.C.
§ 552(b)(5) (1976). The FOMC argued that the Records of Policy Actions were exempt under the
"predecisional" privilege of exemption 5. 413 F. Supp. at 502. See notes 31-37 and accompany-
ing text infra.
The FOMC also contended that its Records of Policy Actions were protected under exemp-
tion 2, which applies to intra-agency personnel rules and practices. 413 F. Supp. at 502. See 5
U.S.C. § 552(b)(2) (1976); note 22 infra. The district court held that this exemption was not
applicable because the Records of Policy Actions were not "house-keeping" matters dealing with
internal personnel rules and practices. 413 F. Supp. at 502.
12. 413 F. Supp. at 507.
13. 413 F. Supp. at 506. The district court found the Domestic Policy Directives to be
within the disclosure requirement for statements of general policy under subsection (a)(1)(D) of
the FOIA. Id. For the text of subsection (a)(1)(D), see note 6 supra. The court also found that
the remaining Records of Policy Actions were subject to disclosure upon their adoption at the
subsequent FOMC meeting. 413 F. Supp. at 506. In passing on the plaintiff's request for the
FOMC Memoranda of Discussion, the court ruled that the "reasonably segregable factual por-
tions" of the memoranda were subject to prompt disclosure. Id. at 507.
Subsequent to the entering of the district court's order and prior to the proceedings in the
court of appeals, the FOMC amended its deferred disclosure policy for the Records of Policy
Actions from a 45-day delay to availability "within a few days" after the subsequent FOMC
meeting. 41 Fed. Reg. 22,261 (1976). See note 9 supra. Since a Record of Policy Actions is not
actually adopted until it is reviewed by the members of the FOMC and approved at their next
monthly meeting, the plaintiff conceded that the new procedure complied with the court's order
5091979-1980]
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Columbia Circuit affirmed,1 4 refusing to find any privilege for confidential
commercial information in exemption 5. " On writ of certiorari, 16 the United
States Supreme Court vacated and remanded, holding that the Domestic
Policy Directives might be protected under an exemption 5 qualified
privilege for confidential commercial information generated by the govern-
ment in the process leading up to the award of a contract. Federal Open
Market Committee v. Merrill, 99 S. Ct. 2800 (1979).
In 1966, Congress enacted the Freedom of Information Act 17 in hopes
of curing the deficiencies in the provisions of the Administrative Procedure
Act concerning public disclosure of agency information.' i The recognized
and, thus, disclosure of the Records of Policy Actions was not at issue in the appellate proceed-
ings. See 565 F.2d at 782. Tihe amendment to the regulations did not, however, resolve the
issue of the Domestic Policy Directives, because the district court had ordered separate and
immediate disclosure of the current Directives promptly after the meeting at which they are
formulated. Id.
The parties also agreed that the factual portions of the Memoranda of Discussions wouldl be
produced pursuant to the district court's order. See 99 S. Ct. at 2806 n.8. Therefore, the only
documents at issue in the court of appeals were the current Domestic Policy Directives. 565
F.2d at 782.
14. Merrill v. Federal Open Mkt. Comm., 565 F.2d 778 (D.C. Cir. 1977), vacated arid
remanded. 99 S. Ct. 2800 (1979).
15. 565 F.2d at 783-87. The court's resistance to an expansive interpretation of exemption 5
is reflected in the following passage:
In view of our mandate to implement the Act's "general philosophy of full agency disclo-
sure unless information is exempt under clearly delineated statutory language," . . . we
decline to create, by rough analogy, a privilege not in existence at the time FOIA was
enacted, and then incorporate this privilege into an exception to the overriding command
of that Act.
Id. at 787, quoting S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., Ist Sess. 3 (1965). The court of appeals also
rejected the FOMC's argument that the Domestic Policy Directives were "predeeisional" and,
thus, within exemption 5. 565 F.2d at 783. For a discussion of the "predecisional" privilege
under exemption 5, see notes 31-37 and accompanying text infra. The FOMC argued that its
policy is not actually adopted until the account manager buys and sells securities in the open
market and that the Directives were thus not final decisions. Id. The court of appeals concluded
that the exercise of somne discretion o)1 the part of the account manager did not undermine the
fact that the Directives represent the policy decisions of the FOMC. Id. The court contended
that a finding that the Directives were not final decisions would "balloon the boundaries of the
privilege for deliberative memoranda far beyond its purposes." Id. For a general discussion of
exemption 5, see notes 24-47 and accompanying text infra.
16. 436 U.S. 917 (1978). The Supreme Court granted certiorari on the strength of the
FOMC's representations that the rulings in the courts below could seriously interfere with the
implementation of national monetary policy. 99 S. Ct. at 2803.
17. Pilli. L. No. 89-487, 80 Stat. 250 (1966) (current version at 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976)), as
anended by Act of Oct. 13, 1978, Puh. L. No. 95-454, tit. IX, § 906(a)(10), 92 Stat. 1225.
18. S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1965) [hereinafter cited as S. REP. No. 813].
See Administrative Procedure Act, ch. 324, § 3, 60 Stat. 238 (1946) (current version at 5 U.S.C.
§ 552 (1976). The four major shortcomings of the disclosure provisions of the Administrative
Procedure Act were described hiv the Senate Committee oni the Judiciary as follows: 1) its
failure to delimit the exception fur nondisclosure of matters "in the public interest"; 2) its broad
exception for documents required to be held confidential for good cause; 3) its requirement that
only persons "properly and directly concerned'" could have access to information; and 4) its
failore to provide a remedv in case of wrongful withholding of information by government offi-
cials. S. REP. No. 813, supra, at 5. See also H.R. REP. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 4-6,
reprinted in [1966] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. Nvs 2418, 2422-23 [hereinafter cited as H.R.
REP. No. 1497] (Administrative Procedure Act had been used as an authority for withholding
rather than disclosing infirmation).
VOL. 25: p. 507510
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legislative purpose of the FOIA was "to establish a general philosophy of full
agency disclosure unless information is exempted under clearly delineated
statutory language."19 To effectuate this goal, the FOIA provides various
modes of disclosure for several classes of government documents, 20 including
current publication in the Federal Register of an agency's "statements of
general policy."21 Recognizing the necessity for protecting some agency in-
formation, Congress included nine exemptions, 22 the fifth of which excludes
from the general disclosure provisions "inter-agency or intra-agency
19. S. REP. No. 813, supra note 18, at 3 (emphasis added). See NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck &
Co., 421 U.S. 132, 136 (1975). For analysis of the legislative history and purposes of the FOIA,
see K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW rREATISE §§ 5:1-:4 (2(1 ed. 1978); Davis, The lnfornation
Act: A Preliminary Analysis, 34 U. CHI. L. REV. 761 (1967).
20. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (1976). Subsection (a)(1) lists the information which must be cur-
rentlv published in the Federal Register. Id. § 552(a)(1). Subsection (a)(2) lists the information
which is to be made available for public inspection an(l copying. Id. § 552(a)(2).
21. Id. § 552(a)(1)(D). For text of this section, see note 6 supra. Subsection (a)(2)(B) provides
that "those statements of policy and interpretations which have been adopted by the agency and
are not published in the Federal Register" shall be available for public inspection. 5 U.S.C. §
552(a)(2)(B) (1976).
22. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 552(b)(1)-(9) (1976). The general disclosure section of FOIA does not
apply to matters that are
(1)(A) specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept
secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy and (B) are in fact properly
classified pursuant to such Executive order;
(2) related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency;
(3) specifically exempted from disclosure by statute (other than section 552b of this title),
provided that such statute (A) requires that the matters be withheld from the public in
such a manner as to leave no discretion on the issue, or (B) establishes particular criteria
for withholding or refers to particular types of matters to be withheld;
(4) trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person and
privileged or confidental;
(5) inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which wcould not be available by
law to a party other than an agency in litigation cith the agency;
(6) personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a
clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy:
(7) investigatory records compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent
that the production of such records would (A) interfere with enforcement proceedings, (B)
deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or an impartial adjudication, (C) constitute an
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, (D) disclose the identitv of a confidential source
and, ... [in 'certain limited instances of a criminal or national security investigation],
confidential information furnished b\, a confidential source, (E) disclose investigative
techniques and procedure, or (F) endanger the life or physical safety of law enforcement
personnel;
(8) contained in or related to examination, operating, or condition reports prepared by,
on behalf of, or for the use of an agency responsible for the regulation or supervision of
financial institutions;
(9) geological and geophysical information and data, including maps, concerning wells.
Id. (emphasis added). See generally Singleton & Hunter, Statutory and judicial Responses to
the Problem of Access to Government Information, 1979 DET. C.L. REV. 51; Note, 'le Free-
dora of Information Act-The Parameters of the Exemptions, 62 GEO. L.J. 177 (1973); Comment,
The Freedom of Information Act; A Survey of Litigation Under the Exemptions, 48 Miss. L.J.
784 (1977); Comment, Access to Information? Exemptions From Disclosure Under the Freedom
of Information Act and the Privacy Act of 1974, 13 WILLAMETTE L.J. 135 (1976). For an
extensive guide to the litigation and to the legal commentary concerning the FOIA, see U.S.
DEPT OF JUSTICE, FREEDOM OF INFORMATION CASE LIST (1979).
1979-19801
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memorandums or letters which would not be available by law to a party
other than an agency in litigation with the agency." 23
The courts' analytical approach to exemption 5 has focused, first, on
whether the documents at issue qualify as inter-agency or intra-agency
memoranda, 24 and, second, on whether privileges applicable to such docu-
ments in a civil discovery context were intended to be recognized within
exemption 5.25 Thus, in applying the first prong of this analysis, the court
in American Mail Lines, Ltd. v. Gulick 26 ruled that because an internal
memorandum had been publicly cited by an agency as the sole basis for the
agency's action, it thereby lost its intra-agency status and became a public
record outside the protection of exemption 5.27
Litigation concerning exemption 5 has, however, centered primarily on
the second prong - i.e., the question of which civil discovery privileges
normally available to an agency in private litigation are applicable in exemp-
tion 5 cases. 28  In deciding this issue, courts have generally kept in view
both the FOIA's philosophy of broad disclosure of agency information 29 and
Congress' concern for the continued "full and frank exchange of ideas"
within an agency. 30
In EPA v. Mink, 3' the Supreme Court noted that the civil discovery
rules could only be applied to exemption 5 by way of rough analogies. 32  In
Mink, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) had refused a request
under the FOIA for disclosure of documents containing the EPA's recoin-
mendations to the President concerning underground nuclear testing pro-
grams. 33  The Court acknowledged the general civil discovery privilege for
23. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5) (1976). See note 22 supra. See generally Note, The Freedom of
Information Act and the Exemption for Intra-Agency Memoranda, 86 HARv. L. REV. 1047
(1973); Comment, The Freedom of Information Act and Its Internal Memoranda Exemp-
tion: Time For a Practical Approach, 27 Sw. L.J. 806 (1973).
24. See, e.g., EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 85 (1973); NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421
U.S. 132, 158 (1975). See also notes 26-27 and accompanying text infra.
25. See notes 28-47 and accompanying text infra.
26. 411 F.2d 696 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
27. Id. at 698, 703. The court in Gulick required the Maritime Subsidy Board to release an
internal memorandum which the Board acknowledged to be the basis of its ordering a refund of
subsidy payments from American Mail Line, Ltd. Id.
28. See notes 31-47 and accompanying text infra.
29. See note 19 and accompanying text supra.
30. H.R. REP. No. 1497, supra note 18, at 10. See S. REP. No. 813, supra note 18, at 9.
See also Bristol-Myers Co. v. FTC, 424 F.2d 935, 939 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 824
(1970) (purely factual reports and scientific data in FTC rulemaking proceedings must be dis-
closed); American Mail Lines, Ltd. v. Gulick, 411 F.2d 696, 703 & n.13 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (inter-
nal memorandum, publicly cited by agency as the sole basis for agency decision, is a public
record).
31. 410 U.S. 73 (1973).
32. Id. at 86. The Court noted that although the language of exemption 5 clearly con-
templated that the public would be entitled to all documents which a private party could dis-
cover in litigation with an agency, the rules governing such discovery have always been uncer-
tain. Id.
33. Id. at 75. Congresswoman Patsy Mink had requested the release of the agency docu-
ments, which contained conflicting recommendations concerning the advisability of underground
nuclear testing. Id. The EPA denied the request, arguing that the documents were exempt
[VOL. "25: p. 507
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"confidential intra-agency advisory opinions" 3 4 and found that the legislative
history of the FOIA demonstrated that Congress intended to include this
privilege in exemption 5.35 While recognizing that the EPA's advisory rec-
ommendations were, thus, privileged and exempt from disclosure, the
Court emphasized that, as in the general civil discovery context, this "pre-
decisional" privilege would be applicable only insofar as necessary to protect
the deliberative or consultative function of agency decisionmaking.3 6  There-
fore, the Court concluded that exemption 5 did not protect purely factual
material in deliberate memoranda which was severable from the privileged
parts of the documents. 3 7
Exemption 5's privileges were further defined by the Supreme Court in
NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 3a where the Court determined that the
attorney work-product privilege recognized in the civil discovery context also
extended to exemption 5.9 The plaintiff in Sears sought disclosure of the
"advice and appeals memoranda" of the General Counsel of the National
Labor Relations Board (NLRB).40  These memoranda reflected administra-
tive decisions to file or dismiss unfair labor practice complaints. 4 1  The
Court found that the memoranda pertaining to the NLRB's issuance of a
complaint were privileged in civil litigation, and exempt under FOIA, since
from disclosure under exemptions 1 and 5 of the FOIA. Id. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1), (5) (1976);
note 22 supra. The Supreme Court sustained the, EPA's argument that documents specifically
classified "'top secret" by executive order were within the protection of exemption 1. 410 U.S.
at 75-84.
34. Id. at 86, quoting Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. United States, 157 F. Supp.
939, 946 (Ct. C1. 1958). In Kaiser Aluminum, the Court of Claims denied an aluminum com-
pany access to the government records of a proposed contract between the government and
Kaiser because the records were advisory. 157 F. Supp. at 946. The court explained that the
privilege arose from the policy of promoting open and frank discussion in administrative de-
cisionmaking. Id.
35. 410 U.S. at 87. The Court relied on congressional language which stated:
It was pointed out in the comments of many of the agencies that it would be impossible
to have any frank discussion of legal or policy matters in writing if all such writings were
to be subjected to public scrutiny. It was argued, and with merit, that efficiency of Gov-
ernment would be greatly hampered if, with respect to legal and policy matters, all Gov-
ernment agencies were prematurely forced to operate in a fishbowl.
Id., quoting S. REP. No. 813, supra note 18, at 9.
36. 410 U.S. at 87-91.
37. Id. at 91.
38. 421 U.S. 132 (1975).
39. Id. at 154.
40. Id. at 136. Pursuant to the procedure of the NLRB, when a private party files an unfair
labor practice charge, the General Counsel issues an "Advice Memorandum" to a regional direc-
tor presenting the General Counsel's determination of whether the NLRB should file a com-
plaint or dismiss charges. Id. at 132-42. If the Board decides against filing a complaint, the
private party may appeal to the General Counsel, who, upon further consideration, issues an
"Appeals Memorandum" which is binding on the NLRB. Id. Sears sought the memoranda is-
sued within five years on the subject of employer withdrawal from multi-employer bargaining
and related labor relations issues. Id. at 142-43. The NLRB refused disclosure, arguing that the
memoranda were not final decisions and were exempt under exemptions 5 and 7, since they were
both predecisional and investigative. Id. at 143-44.
41. See note 40 supra.
1979-1980]
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they were prepared by an attorney in contemplation of litigation. 42  In
reaching this conclusion, the Court noted that the legislative history of FOIA
expressly envisioned that the attorney work-product privilege would be rec-
ognized under exemption 5.43 Turning to the memoranda which explained
the NLRB's dismissal of complaints, the Court found that these memoranda
were final agency decisions which must be disclosed.4 4  The Court explained
that'the protective "predecisional" privilege recognized in Mink was in-
applicable, 45 noting that since the quality of a decision could only be affected
prior to the time the decision is made, 46 the disclosure of these memoranda
explaining final decisions would not intrude on the predecisional process.
47
Against this background the Merrill Conrt 48 began its analysis by de-
termining that the FOMC's Domestic Policy Directives were inter-agency or
intra-agency memoranda within the meaning of exemption 5.49 The Court
42. 421 U.S. at 160. The Court did not clearly indicate the scope of the privilege, stating
only that "[w]hatever the outer boundaries of the attorney's work-product rule are, the rule
clearly applies to memoranda prepared by an attorney in contemplation of litigation which set
forth the attorney's theory of the case and his litigation strategy." 421 U.S. at 154 (citations
omitted). In a subsequent decision, Justice Powell suggested that the entire work-product
privilege was not meant to be incorporated into exemption 5, but rather, it is the predecisional
characteristic of the privilege which is involved. See NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437
U.S. 214, 254 n.12 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
In Mead Data Cent., Inc. v. United States Dep't of the Air Force, 566 F.2d 242 (D.C. Cir.
1977), the court of appeals relied upon Sears in recognizing a general attorney-client privilege
within exemption 5. Id. at 252-53 & n.20. For criticism of the Mead court's extension of Sears,
see Comment, Mead Data Central, Inc. v. United States Department of the Air Force: Extend-
ing the FOIA's 5th Exemption, 19 WM. & MARY L. REV. 343, 356-58 (1977).
43. 421 U.S. at 154, 160. The Court relied on language in the Senate Report which pro-
vided that exemption 5 "would include the working papers of the agency attorney and docu-
ments which would come within the attorney-client privilege if applied to private parties." Id.
at 154, quoting S. REP. No. 813, supra note 18, at 2.
44. 421 U.S. at 151-55. The Sears Court concluded that the provisions of the FOIA sup-
ported the distinction between predecisional communications and final opinions because the
Act's affirmative disclosure requirements specifically referred to "final opinions" and "statements
of policy and interpretations which have been adopted by the agency." Id. at 153, quoting 5
U.S.C. § 522(a)(2)(A), (B) (1976). The Court commented:
We should be reluctant, therefore, to construe Exemption 5 to apply to the docu-
ments described in 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2) [defining which documents shall be made availa-
ble for public inspection and copying]; and with respect at least to "final opinions," which
not only invariably explain agency action already taken or au agency decision already
made, hut also constitute "final dispositions" of matters by an agency, . . . we hold that
Exemption 5 can never apply.
421 U.S. at 153-54 (footnote omitted).
The distinction between final opinions and predecisional communications was reasserted in
the companion case to Sears, Renegotiation Bd. v. Grumman Aircraft Eng'r Co., 421 U.S. 168
(1975). In Grumman, the Court held that since only the full Renegotiation Board had power to
determine the existence of excessive profits on government contracts, the Board's regional and
division reports concerning excessive profits were predecisional and, therefore, privileged from
disclosure. Id. at 187-90.
45. 421 U.S. at 150-55. For a discussion of the "predecisional" privilege recognized by the
Mink Court, see notes 34-36 and accompanying text supra.
46. 421 U.S. at 151.
47. Id. at 155.
48. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Brennan, White, Marshdl, Blackmun, Powell, and
Rehnquist composed the majority. 99 S. Ct. at 2803, 2814.
49. Id. at 2808. See notes 24-27 and accompanying text supra.
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then considered the FOMC's principal contention that exemption 5 confers
on agencies the general authority to delay disclosure of memoranda if the
immediate release of the documents would undermine the effectiveness of
agency policy. 50 After finding that no such general privilege. existed in the
civil discovery context, the Court concluded that the privilege could not be
found within exemption 5.51 The majority also observed that recognition of
such a broad privilege would undermine the FOIA's basic principle of full
disclosure. 52
Turning to what it considered the "most plausible" of the FOMC's ar-
guments, 53 the Court considered whether exemption 5 includes a privilege
based on rule 26(c)(7) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 54 which em-
powers a court to order "that a trade secret or other confidential research,
development, or commercial information not be disclosed or be disclosed
only in a designated way." 55 The Court acknowledged that a privilege for
50. 99 S. Ct. at 2809. The FOMC suggested that such authority existed even if the docu-
ments could be routinely discovered. 1d.
51. Id.
52. Id. The Court noted that such an interpretation of exemption 5 would permit an agency
to withhold information whenever it concluded that the efficiency of its operations or the public
interest would not be promoted by the disclosure. Id. The Court stressed that Congress had
repeatedly rejected the incorporation of such a vague "public interest" standard into exemptions
under the FOIA. Id., citing H.R. REP. No. 1497, supra note 18, at 5, 9; S. REP. No. 813,
supra note 18, at 3, 5, 8. See also EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. at 79-80.
53. 99 S. Ct. at 2810. The FOMC had also asserted that exemption 5 includes: 1) a privilege
for "official government information" if disclosure of the information would harm the public
interest; and 2) a privilege based on rule 26(c)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which
permits discovery only on specified terms. Id. at 2810 n.17. Neither of these arguments was
considered by the Court. Id. The FOMC did not argue that the Directives were protected by
the predecisional privilege, as it had done in the court of appeals. Id. at 2809 n.14.
54. 99 S. Ct. at 2810. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(7). In considering whether rule 26(c)(7) was
within exemption 5, the Court noted:
We hesitate to construe Exemption 5 to incorporate a civil discovery privilege that would
substantially duplicate another exemption. Given that Congress specifically recognized
that certain discovery privileges were incorporated into Exemption 5, and dealt with
other civil discovery privileges in exemptions other than Exemption 5, a claim that a
privilege other than [predecisional] privilege or the attorney privilege is covered by
Exemption 5 must be viewed with caution.
99 S. Ct. at 2810.
55. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(7). While rule 26 generally deals with civil discovery, rule 26(c)
describes the grounds upon which courts may protect information from discovery. See generally
4 MoonE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 26.61(2), at 263 (2d ed. 1976).
The Merrill Court acknowledged that a qualified evidentiary privilege for trade secrets and
other confidential commercial information had been recognized by the federal courts. 99 S. Ct.
at 2810. See EA. do Pont de Nemours Powder Co. v. Masland, 244 U.S. 100, 103 (1917) (where
a secret process is alleged, in camera treatment of the evidence is appropriate). The Court also
noted that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were applicable to the United States as a party.
See 99 S. Ct. at 2810, citing inter alia United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677,
681 (1958). Finally, the majority noted that during civil cases the government should be able to
obtain a protective order under rule 26(c)(7). 99 S. Ct. 2810 & n.19, citing Menominee Eng'r
Corp. v. United States, 20 Fed. Rules Serv. 2d 894 (Ct. C1. 1975); Consolidated Box Co. v.
United States, 18 Fed. Rules Serv. 2d 115 (Ct. C1. 1973). In Consolidated Box, the Court of
Claims ruled that data concerning excessive profit determinations of the Renegotiation Board
was discoverable by a party in litigation with the Board, but, pursuant to rule 71(f) of the Court
of Claims, disclosure would only be made to the plaintiff's attornev. Id. at 121.
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"confidential ... commercial information" did not enjoy unequivocal sup-
port in the FOIA's legislative history as did the predecisional and the at-
torney work-product privileges. 56  Nevertheless, the majority focused on
language of the House Report which provided that "a Government agency
cannot always operate effectively if it is required to disclose documents or
information which it has received or generated before it completes the process
of awarding a contract or issuing an order, decision or regulation." 57  The
Court reasoned that this language reflected the concern for the confidential-
ity of commercial information expressed by various federal agencies during
congressional hearings, 58 and concluded that exemption 5 includes a qual-
ified privilege for confidential commercial information generated by the gov-
ernment in the process leading up to awarding a contract. 59  The Court
explained that the purpose of this privilege was to preclude placing the gov-
ernment at a competitive disadvantage or endangering the consummation of
government contracts.
6 0
The Court found that the FOMC's Domestic Policy Directives might
fall within the scope of this newly recognized privilege since they are sub-
stantially similar to confidential commercial information generated in the
process of awarding a contract. 6' The majority reasoned that the Directives
were "surely confidential" while operative, and commercial in nature, be-
cause they related to buying and selling securities. 62  The majority ob-
served, however, that the privilege for confidential commercial information
in rule 26(c)(7), like most discovery privileges, was not absolute but predi-
56. 99 S. Ct. at 2810-11. See NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. at 154, EPA v.
Mink, 410 U.S. at 86; notes 31-47 and accompanying text supra.
57. 99 S. Ct. at 2812, quoting H.R. REP. No. 1497, supra note 18, at 10 (emphasis supplied
by the Court).
58. Id. at 2811 & nn.20 & 21. The Court examined the testimony of various agencies,
including that of the Acting General Counsel of the Department of the Treasury, who specifi-
cally expressed concern that premature disclosure of the planned monetary policy of the Federal
Reserve System would have "serious effects on the orderly handling of the Government's financ-
ing requirements." Id. at 2811 n.21, quoting H.R. REP. No. 5012, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 49
(1965). For a discussion of the Court's inference that exemption 5 incorporated protection for
these concerns, see notes 74-83 and accompanying text infra.
59. 99 S. Ct. at 2812.
60. Id. The Court compared this privilege for commercial information with the predecisional
privilege recognized in Mink. Id. See notes 34-37 and accompanying text supra. The Court
stressed that documents shielded by the predecisional privilege remain privileged even after the
agency decision is made, since disclosure would inhibit the free flow of advice and opinions in
an agency. 99 S. Ct. at 2812. By contrast, the majority found that the rationale for protecting
confidential commercial information generated in the process of awarding a contract expires
upon the award of the contract or withdrawal of the offer. Id. See notes 84-87 and accompanying
text infra. The majority further noted that this limited exemption 5 privilege did not substan-
tially duplicate exemption 4, which applies to commercial information obtained from a person
outside the government. 99 S. Ct. at 2812. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) (1976). For the text of
exemption 4, see note 22 supra.
61. 99 S. Ct. at 2813.
62. Id. The Court suggested that since the Domestic Policy Directives provide direction for
the government's purchases and sales of securities, they could be seen as the government's
buy-sell order to its broker. Id. For a description of the Directives, see note 4 supra.
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cated on a balancing of the agency's interest in privacy against the need for
disclosure. 63  The Court, while recognizing that the FOIA precludes consid-
eration of the applicant's need, 64 concluded that the agency's interests may
nevertheless be considered, and stated that a delay in disclosure of the Di-
rectives was permissible if their immediate release would significantly harm
the government's monetary functions. 65  The Court, therefore, remanded
the case to the district court for a determination of the impact that immediate
disclosure of the Directives would have on the FOMC. 66
In a strong dissent, Justice Stevens 67 criticized the majority's decision to
permit temporary suppression of the Directives, pointing out that the FOIA
explicitly provided for only current release or total exemption.6 8  The dis-
sent also disagreed with the majority's analogy of the FOMC's Directives to
memoranda generated in the process of awarding a contract,69 contending
that the government's procurement negotiations were clearly distinct from
its regulation of financial markets. 70  The dissent concluded that exemption
5 was inapplicable and that the majority's inclusion of a commercial privilege
in that exemption lacked the support of the legislative history of the
63. 99 S. Ct. at 2813. The Court recognized that orders under rule 26(c)(7) forbidding any
disclosure of trade secrets or confidential commercial information are rare, and that protective
orders limiting disclosure to counsel or parties are usually entered. Id. at 2813 n.24. See, e.g.,
Chesa Int'l, Ltd. v. Fashion Assoc., Inc., 425 F. Supp. 234, 237 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (order to
produce names of customers included protective provision that the data would be for the use of
plaintiff's attorneys only).
64. 99 S. Ct. at 2813. See NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. at 149 n.16; EPA v.
Mink, 410 U.S. at 86.
65. 99 S. Ct. at 2814. The FOMC argued that prompt disclosure of the Directives would
interfere with orderly policy execution and give unfair advantage to large investors. Id. at 2806,
2814. The FOMC additionally contended that immediate release of the Directives would lead to
the imposition of substantial borrowing costs on the United States Treasury. Id. at 2814 & n.25.
The Court concluded that if the FOMC could prove these allegations, "a slight delay in the
publication of the Directives, such as that authorized by 12 CFR § 271.5, would be permitted
under Exemption 5." 99 S. Ct. at 2814. For the text of this regulation, see note 9 supra.
66. 99 S. Ct. at 2814. The Court noted that the lower courts had not heard arguments on
this issue, and remanded the case to the district court for determination of whether, or to what
extent, the Domestic Policy Directives would be protected in civil discovery. Id. This was
necessary because the privilege recognized by the Court was a qualified one and an adequate
record had not been developed below. Id. at 2813-14. If, on remand, the district court con-
cluded that the Directives would be afforded protection, then it was also to consider "whether
the operative portions of the Domestic Policy Directives can feasibly be segregated from the
purely descriptive materials therein, and the latter made subject to disclosure or publication
without delay." Id. at 2814 (footnote omitted). See EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. at 91 (requiring
disclosure of factual material segregable from privileged report).
67. Justice Stevens was joined in this dissent by Justice Stewart. 99 S. Ct. at 2814 (Stevens,
J., dissenting).
68. Id. at 2816 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See notes 20 & 21 supra.
69. See 99 S. Ct at 2813; notes 61-62 and accompanying text supra.
70. 99 S. Ct. at 2815 n.2 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens further noted that the
language of the House Report relied on by the majority dealt with the predecisional stage of
contractual negotiations, while the FOMC's policy directives reflected the final position and
action of the government. Id.
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FOIA. 7 1 Justice Stevens also observed that Congress had specifically re-
fused to amend exemption 4 to protect the type of information at issue.
72
In considering the Merrill Court's analysis, it should be noted that in
justifying its recognition of a qualified privilege for confidential commercial
information under exemption 5, the Court relied substantially on a House
Report. 73  It is submitted that the Court's use of this House Report is sub-
ject to criticism in two respects. The first of these is the Court's conclusion
that Congress did intend to protect the confidentiality of commercial infor-
mation generated by government agencies in exemption 5.74 It is submitted
that, as noted by the dissent, Congress chose to protect commercial informa-
tion solely in exemption 4 and limited such protection to information ob-
tained from outside the government. 75  It is suggested that by addressing
commercial information in exemption 4 and omitting any protection for
commercial information generated by the government, Congress implicitly
rejected such protection. 76
The majority's second dubious determination based on the House Re-
port is that specific language in the Report actually represents the supposed
protection for the confidentiality of the government's commercial informa-
tion. 77 It is submitted that, as the dissent pointed out, the language at issue
actually reflects concern for "predecisional" deliberations, not commercial in-
formation generated by the government. 78  While the majority emphasized
an isolated phrase in the House Report, 79 it is suggested that a reading of
the entire sentence indicates that the reference to information generated
before awarding a contract was only one example of various types of ac-
71. Id. Justice Stevens noted that the language which the majority had relied upon in the
House Report was absent from the Senate Report, which the court had previously recognized to
be the more accurate description of congressional intent. Id., citing Department of the Air
Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 363-67 (1975).
72. 99 S. Ct. at 2815 n.2 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens stressed that the agency
involved in this case had unsuccessfully attempted to convince Congress to provide protection
for Domestic Policy Directives in exemption 4. Id., citing H.R. REP. No. 5012, 89th Cong. 1st
Sess. 51, 55, 228, 229 (1965). Justice Stevens felt that the majority's decision served to circum-
vent this congressional denial. 99 S. Ct. at 2815 n.2 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Finally, Justice
Stevens warned that the majority's newly created privilege would impose substantial litigation
costs and burdens on future FOIA applicants by requiring proof that disclosure would not harm
the government's financial interests. Id. at 2816 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
73. 99 S. Ct. at 2811-12. See notes 57-59 and accompanying text supra.
74. See notes 58-59 and accompanying text supra. Whether the FOMC's commercial in-
terests would be affected by immediate disclosure of the Directives was unclear. Under existing
FOMC disclosure procedures, 25 large commercial investors and dealers receive the first indica-
tions of FOMC policy through their transactions with the government. 99 S. Ct. at 2805. The
dissent questioned whether timely disclosure to the general public would actually result in any
harm to the government. Id. at 2814 & n.1 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
75. Id. at 2814 n.2 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See note 72 and accompanying text supra.
76. See note 72 and accompanying text supra. For the text of exemption 4, see note 22
supra.
77. See notes 57-59 and accompanying text supra.
78. 99 S. Ct. at 2815 n.2 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
79. 99 S. Ct. at 2812. See note 57 and accompanying text supra.
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tivities conducted before an agency makes a decision."s It is submitted that
the Court improperly superimposed commercial connotations on this isolated
"predecisional" phrase. 81  It is further submitted that since the Domestic
Policy Directives were final determinations of the FOMC's monthly mone-
tary policy,8 2 they were outside the scope of the predecisional privilege and
were to be currently published in the Federal Register, as required by the
affirmative disclosure provisions of the FOIA. 83
The majority sought to reinforce the propriety of recognizing a qualified
privilege for commercial information by distinguishing between the purposes
for the predecisional privilege and the newly recognized privilege.84  In so
doing, the Court reasoned that although documents protected by the pre-
decisional privilege remain privileged even after the decision is made,
documents protected by the privilege for confidential commercial informa-
tion generated in the process of awarding a contract lose their protection as
soon as the contract is awarded. 85 It is submitted that the Court's reasoning
fails to explain the relationship between the two privileges where the pre-
decisional communications are of a commercial nature, 8 6 and creates uncer-
tainty in the law by ignoring past decisions which have applied the predeci-
sional privilege to documents concerning contractual negotiations after the
award or denial of a contract.8 7
80. The House Report states: "Moreover, a Government agency cannot always operate effec-
tively if it is required to disclose documents or information which it has received or generated
before it completes the process of awarding a contract or issuing an order, decision or regula-
tion." H.R. REP. No. 1497, supra note 18, at 10 (emphasis added).
81. See note 80 and accompanying text supra.
82. The Domestic Policy Directives do not reflect the give-and-take of the deliberative pro-
cess which the predecisional privilege is intended to protect; instead, they represent the em-
bodiment of the FOMC's effective policy. See Federal Open Market Comm. v. Merrill, 413 F.
Stipp. at 503-04. See also note 4 supra. The FOMC itself agreed in the district court that the
Domestic Policy Directives are statements of general policy within the meaning of §
552(a)(1)(D). 413 F. Supp. at 504. For the text of § 552(a)(1)(D), see note 6 supra. Indeed, as
Justice Stevens noted, the majority in Merrill never disagreed with the court of appeal's charac-
terization of the Directives as "statements of general policy." 99 S. Ct. at 2815 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
83. See 99 S. Ct. at 2815 (Stevens, J., dissenting). For the relevant disclosure provision, see
note 6 supra.
84. 99 S. Ct. at 2812. See note 60 supra.
85. 99 S. Ct. at 2812.
86. The Court's reasoning suggests that commercial information would not be privileged
after a contract is awarded or an offer is withdrawn, even if the information was predecisional and
not relied upon in the final decision. Id. It is submitted that such a result would inhibit the full
and frank exchange of ideas within an agency which the Court sought to protect in Mink. See
notes 31-36 and accompanying text supra.
87. See, e.g., Mead Data Cent., Inc. v. United States Dep't of the Air Force, 575 F.2d 932,
934-35 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (government's cost comparisons, feasibility opinions, and explanatory
data prepared in responding to computer system proposal privileged as deliberative even after
proposal was rejected); Washington Research Proj., Inc. v. HEW, 504 F.2d 238, 250 (D.C. Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 963 (1975) (site visit reports prepared by outside consultants for
initial evaluation of grant application privileged even after denial of the grant). Cf. Consumers
Union of U.S., Inc. v. Veterans Admin., 301 F. Supp. 796 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (where plaintiff
sought records of hearing aid test program used by the government in procurement activity, the
court's analysis of the applicability of exemption 5 was in terms of predecisional privilege, with-
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It is suggested that another area of the Court's decision subject to criti-
cism is its recognition of a delayed disclosure provision within the FOIA. 88
As forcefully pointed out by the dissent, there is no reference to delayed
disclosure in the statute, which provides only for current release or total
exemption. 8 9 The majority failed to provide any statutory justification for its
conclusion, apparently believing that the discretionary disclosure provisions
of rule 26(c)(7) were fully incorporated into exemption 5.90
In considering the impact of Merrill, it is suggested that the decision
reflects a more liberal treatment of exemption 5 claims than was followed in
the earlier Mink and Sears cases, where the Court's recognition of privileges
within exemption 5 was buttressed by clear language in the legislative his-
tory of the Act. 9 1 In Merrill, however, in the absence of such clear legisla-
tive support, the Court was content to focus on the agency's interest in
privacy. 92 If such an approach is taken in future cases, it is suggested that
even more privileges will be found in exemption 5.
It is also submitted that the Court's holdihg in Merrill may serve as a
basis for numerous instances where government agencies refuse to disclose
commercial information on the basis of alleged harm to their commercial
interests. 93 It is suggested that such claims will force more FOIA applicants
into litigation over the extent to which the agencies will be harmed by dis-
closure, thereby undermining the basic purposes of FOIA. 94 Moreover, it is
suggested that the 'Court's approval of a delay in disclosure poses further
obstacles to FOIA applicants. While prior to Merrill, the FOIA applicant
faced only the alternatives of disclosure or refusal, the Court's approval of a
delay in disclosure now presents the possibility of nondisclosure for varying
periods of time. 95  Since neither a delay in disclosure nor the scope of any
such delay is addressed in the FOIA, it is submitted that the newly recog-
out reference to any commercial privilege). In exempting the government's commercial informa-
tion under the predecisional privilege, the Mead Data court reasoned as follows:
They [cost comparisons and feasibility opinions] are not raw facts with informational value
in their own right, but instead serve primarily to reveal the "evaluative" process by which
different members of the decision-making chain arrived at their conclusions - and what
those predecisional conclusions are. In addition, the cost comparisons and feasibility opin-
ions are directed at a very specific decision, i.e., whether or not to accept MDC's pro-
posal.
Id. at 935 (citations omitted).
88. See note 65 and accompanying text supra.
89. See notes 67-68 and accompanying text supra.
90. See 99 S. Ct. at 2810.
91. See note 56 and accompanying text supra.
92. See notes 64-65 and accompanying text supra.
93. Under the Merrill holding, federal agencies may deny FOIA requests on the basis of
harm to their monetary functions or commercial interests. See 99 S. Ct. at 2816 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). For example, procurement decisions or taxing policies may be withheld for sup-
posed commercial reasons.
94. See note 19 and accompanying text supra.
95. See notes 88-90 and accompanying text supra. The Court found that a delay such as the
one provided by the FOMC's regulations might be authorized, depending upon the significance
of the harm which would result to the government's monetary or commercial interests. 99 S.
Ct. at 1213-14.
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nized privilege will require judicial delimitation of appropriate delay for par-
ticular types of commercial information and, thus, will impose substantial
litigation costs and burdens on future FOIA applicants.9 6
In conclusion, it is submitted that Merrill represents a departure from
the Supreme Court's previous narrow interpretations of exemption 5 of the
FOIA. 9 7  Although the Court was understandably concerned by the
FOMC's claims of serious harm to government interests should the current
Directives be disclosed, 98 it is submitted that in the FOIA Congress has
specifically defined the "workable balance between the right of the public to
know and the need of the government to keep information in confidence," 99
and that the majority has failed to strictly apply this congressional determi-
nation. It is submitted that the Court's decision brings closer to realization
an early commentator's observation that exemption 5 could become the most
expansive exemption of the FOIA. 100
Roman J. Koropey
96. See note 95 and accompanying text supra.
97. See notes 91-92 and accompanying text supra. See also Note, Developments Under the
Freedom of Information Act-1976, 1977 DUKE L.J. 532, 541 (suggesting that the district court
opinion in Merrill was well-reasoned and a contrary holding would be difficult to justify).
98. See note 65 supra.
99. H.R. REP. No. 1497, supra note 18, at 6.
100. See Note, supra note 23, at 1048-49.
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